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This article examines individual opinions about the causes and consequences of
social and economic inequalities in four countries: Denmark, France, Italy and
Sweden
2. It is based on a questionnaire especially built to test ethical judgments
about social inequality factors and about redistributive policies. The questionnaire is
composed, on the one hand, of complex scenarios which question the legitimacy of
the redistributive solutions of various forms and, on the other hand, of simple
questions where one asks to make a direct judgement of the fairness of some
institutional arrangements and of different policies aiming at reducing inequalities
The scenarios
3 are structured in the following way: they tell a story about four
people who, according to the issue at stake, either have the same problem of health,
or have school problems, or do the same studies, etc. If, therefore, for each question
the context is fixed in the same way for the four people, the individual situations
differ according to the nature of the causes who underlie their more or less bad
situation.
By the ‘nature’ of the causes we refer to the fact that the individual situations
depend on variables that are classified in two categories: variables of circumstances
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and  variables  of  choice  or  responsibility.  The  typology  is  connected  to  the
normative debate on inequality. The relevance of this typology constitutes the
principal subject of our investigation.
More particularly, we try to find out whether individual opinions are sensitive to the
distinction  between  “circumstances”  and  “responsible  choice”,  and  if  this
distinction is similar over different contexts, i.e. for inequalities which touch the
spheres of health and education.
In theory, variables of circumstances correspond to individual characteristics that
are innate or induced by the environment (“handicaps” or “talents”), while the
discretionary aspects of individual behaviour are the “variables of responsible
choice”. By this empirical examination we seek to identify what people regard as
being innate, induced or consciously chosen.
In the scenarios suggested, the variables of ‘circumstances’ and ‘responsibility’ are
typically twofold: either they improve or they worsen the individual situation,
which implies four possible combinations. Thus, for example, in a given scenario
(call it “X”), the first of the four protagonists will be subject to the joint positive
influence of both variables of circumstances and variables of responsibility, the
second will undergo the positive influence of the circumstances and the negative
influence of the bad choices for which he obviously may be held responsible etc.
The individual situations are specified by means of costs or payments that are
typical for the given context. Inequalities between individuals are directly defined in
terms of these costs. We ask the respondents to opt for the fairest one of the
proposals  to  divide  the  costs,  or,  which  comes  down  to  the  same,  of  a
reimbursement scheme of these costs. As a consequence, people express an implicit
opinion on the fair character of the initial costs. Among the possible redistributive
solutions, the majority of the scenarios propose six possible schemes that specify
each a theoretical viewpoint of the distributive justice debate. Firstly, we propose
two principles of equality: the first (formal) one corresponding to equality of public
contributions  and  the  second  (substantial)  one,  corresponding  to  equality  of
individual contributions.
One can qualify a principle as formally egalitarian insofar as it aims at an equal
treatment of all citizens. This principle of equal treatment is essential in what is
often  dubbed  as  ‘democratic  egalitarianism’.  This  vision  is  opposed  to  the
egalitarian  theories  which  aim  not  only  an  equal  treatment  but  also  an  equal
outcome, i.e. equality or at least some equalization of the conditions of living. In
this last case one speaks about substantial egalitarian principles.  Our first principle
is a principle of strict equal treatment: it consists in making the same amount
available for each citizen in order to satisfy a particular need. The second one is
substantial. It is egalitarian to the extent that it treats equals equally. Everyone must
contribute in the same way, but those who have more important needs are dealt with
proportionally to their needs. This conforms to the idea according to which those
who are in an identical situation are treated equally (`vertical equity').3
In these two cases, one focuses either on the contribution of the State or on that of
the individuals, without taking into account any responsibility of the individuals for
their situation.
We  propose  then  two  principles  which  are  largely  tested  in  the  experimental
literature: the axioms developed by Fleurbaey-Bossert (1996) which recommend (a)
equality of the public contributions for people facing the same initial circumstances
(i.e. principle of compensation); (b) equality of the individual contributions for
people who are similarly responsible (called ‘principle of natural reward’). Finally,
we  propose  two  criteria  combining  the  axioms  of  Fleurbaey-Bossert  which
respectively give more and less weight to the axiom (a).
1
Certain scenarios are not conceived on the scheme just presented (crossing of
variables of responsibility and circumstance, with the six mentioned distributive
solutions).  Nevertheless,  they  test  the  attractiveness  of  the  same  normative
conceptions. They will be the subject of a detailed description when we will discuss
the results.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 1 the philosophical background of
circumstances-choice dichotomy is presented; section 2 examines the answers to the
scenario-questions and the role of the context whereas section 3 focuses on other
ethical opinions on health and education framework; at last, section 4, analyses the
individual determinants of ethical opinions.
1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
‘In  principle,  I  said,  individuals  should  be  relieved  of  consequential
responsibility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute
bad luck, but not from those that should be seen as flowing from their own
choices. If someone has been born blind or without talents others have, that
is his bad luck, and, so far as this can be managed, a just society would
compensate him for that bad luck. But if he has fewer resources than other
people now because he spent more on luxuries earlier, or because he chose
not to work, or to work at less remunerative jobs than others chose, then his
situation is the result of choice not luck, and he is not entitled to any
compensation that would make up his present shortfall’
2
This quote summarizes clearly the basic idea of ‘luck-egalitarianism’. This
more radical brand of egalitarianism is strongly focused on the distinction between
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legitimate and illegitimate inequalities. Egalitarians in general have made much
effort  to  argue  that  some  inequalities  are  totally  legitimate.  Beside  the  more
common reference to the economic constraint of incentives, luck egalitarians have
stressed that inequalities which are the result of personal choices (and luck related
to  such  choices,  i.e.  option  luck)  are  legitimate,  because  people  may  be  held
responsible for these inequalities. As a consequence, social policy should be based
on a strict distinction between choice and chance. This distinction supposes a clear
separation between factors for which one should be held responsible and other
factors for which one should not be held responsible.
What  is  important  in  this  vision  is  that,  while  being  fundamentally
egalitarian, it concedes to the conservative criticisms of the Welfare State that
inequalities which results from individual choices – lack of effort or ambition,
eccentric preferences for a job that is rarely demanded by the market, etc. – are by
no  means  unfair.  Luck  egalitarianism  incorporates  thus  the  principle  of
responsibility (Barry 2003), i.e. that ‘unequal outcomes are just if they arise from
factors for which individuals can properly be held responsible, and are otherwise
unjust’ (2003, p. 5). Barry pretends that this principle seems to be adhered to by a
large majority of the population, poor as well as rich, and this in all Western
nations.  If this is true – and this is precisely the object of this paper – it follows that
the  implementation  of  ‘luck  egalitarianism’  is  the  appropriate  way  to  realize
substantial egalitarianism. To the extent that a large part of the population accepts
this principle, and more particularly the part which is the least likely to approve of
redistribution based on philosophical principles such as benevolence (utilitarianism)
or impartiality (Rawls), -precisely because these principles  do not take sufficiently
responsibility  into  account,  luck  egalitarians  may  convince  the  ‘tough  crowd’
(Becker 2005) that the corollary of the principle of responsibility valid: we should
compensate  for  the  negative  effects  of  factors  for  which  individuals  cannot
reasonably be held responsible
1.
 Yet the possible impact of luck egalitarianism, as a strategy for policy
reforms, depends on the way in which public opinion fixes the distinction between
chance (i.e. circumstances) factors and responsible choice factors.
This paper focuses on the way in which public opinion fixes this distinction.
However, this distinction and its underlying assumptions do not only matter
from their immediate practical perspective of political feasibility. It is also, on the
normative  level,  of  crucial  importance  for  luck  egalitarianism  as  a  morally
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defensible  theory  of  justice.  Altogether,  we  may  distinguish  four  clusters  of
problems, three of them indirectly relevant to political feasibility, the first one being
a philosophically unresolved puzzle.
First of all, the distinction assumes a paradoxical position with respect to the
famous philosophical debate on determinism and free will. For philosophers, people
are either totally irresponsible because determined or totally responsible because
bearers of free will. Let us consider the first of both options, i.e. the idea that we are
ultimately responsible for nothing. The basic idea is that as soon as we take into
account ‘external’ factors, we are on a slippery slope which leads us to a determinist
view in which there is barely space for moral responsibility. For short, people may
not be able to change the way in which they are wired, and to the extent that
nobody, except God, is causa sui, people cannot be held responsible for their acts.
No more than external constraints, our mental constitution has been chosen: even if
we are able, with a huge effort, to change a character trait, we act on the basis of
other character features for which we are not responsible. When we take into
account some elements which are beyond our control, an infinite regression lurks.
1
The other option, according to which ‘we are responsible for everything’, is
based on the principle of alternate possibilities (Frankfurt 1969)
2: to the extent that
we could, in principle, have behaved differently, we are responsible for our acts.
Invoking circumstances and moral subtleties comes down to refusing to face one’s
responsibility. This  is  what  Sartre  calls  bad  faith.  To  the  extent  that  we  are
conscious, we always choose: « Je me choisis perpétuellement et ne puis jamais être
à titre d’ayant-été-choisi, sinon je retomberai dans la pure et simple existence de
l’en-soi » (Sartre 1943 (1976), p. 612).
It is obvious that this dichotomy is not very fruitful for a discussion of
social policy. Therefore, introducing responsibility in general, and the distinction
between responsibility factors and circumstances in order to estimate the degree of
individual responsibility, seems not to have a strong philosophical basis. Still, even
if we adopt an agnostic position with respect to this debate, and, for instance take a
pragmatic stance,
3 there are other, less fundamental problems cropping up.
The second criticism of luck egalitarianism argues that luck egalitarianism is
self defeating, since it implicitly assumes that some citizens have an inferior status
and this contradicts the notion of equal respect egalitarianism aims to incorporate. A
strongly related third criticism is that luck egalitarianism would, if implemented,
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lead, politically, the public opinion to moral principles which ultimately undermine
the very basis of egalitarianism (Wolff, 1998).
A fourth cluster of criticisms turns around feasibility problems. It is an
essential question of luck egalitarianism how to fix the ‘responsibility cut’, that is
how to separate convincingly which characteristics one should be compensated for
from the characteristics which do not demand any compensation, i.e. which one is
supposed to have ‘chosen’. However, a formal analysis (Fleurbaey, Bossert) of the
link between responsibility and compensation has revealed a consistency problem
among different principles akin to luck egalitarianism. The paper focuses on two
realms in which the ‘responsibility cut’ is politically relevant: health care and
education
1.
2.  THE  ROLE  OF  CONTEXT  IN  ETHICAL  OPINION  ABOUT  THE
CIRCUMSTANCES-CHOICE  DICHOTOMY:  THE  CASE  OF  HEALTH
AND EDUCATION
Using the framework of questions-scenarios (see the frame below), we try here to
underline the potential context dependency of the responsibility cut location. We
here present the results associated to questions-scenarios compared two-by-two.
Three couples of questions are then presented in a manner where the circumstances,
choice or effort, costs and payments variables are exactly the same in terms of
qualification or amount. Only the context belonging either to health or to education
differ
2. However, the last couple of questions only concerns the context of health.
But it is related to different types of circumstances or behaviours.
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2.1 Food habits, medical costs in health context versus ambitions and talents in
the context of education
The  question  1  tells  the  story  of  four  people  who  suffer  from  anaemia.  Each
combines the factors effort and circumstances in a different way.
In the context of health, where the four people are suffering here from anaemia in a
more or less severe form, a large fraction of people prefers to equalize the personal
financial contribution to the payment of the cure, ie the most egalitarian option in a
substantive meaning (principle of equal treatment for equals).
The question 2 tells a rather similar story but in the context of education The
variable  of  responsibility  is  expressed  here  through  individual  ambitions,  the
protagonists of the scenario being differentiated on the basis of the prestige of the
Institute of Arts where they wish to study.
In the context of education, a large fraction of students choose solution A which
consists in equalizing the public contributions (see table 2). This suggests that, on
the one hand, people are considered to be responsible for their ambitions and on the
other  hand,  that  the  differences  in  talent  -due  to  factors  independent  of  the
individual  will-  are  not  likely  of  compensation  either.  The  other  answers  are
distributed more or less uniformly among solutions B, C, D and E (about 15%).
There is then some difference
1, between the solutions chosen depending on the
context. Indeed, in the context of health, the students seem to be more in favour of
egalitarian solution in a substantive meaning than in the context of education.
The comparison between the four countries reveal that in the context of education
and compared to France and Italy, Nordic countries tend to prefer answer A and B
i.e equality of state contributions and equality of personal contributions. In the
context of health, The Danes are noticeable characterized by a preference for
equality of state contributions.
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The « questions-scenarios »
Question 1:
Claire and Caroline suffer from mild anaemia while Fanny and Frances suffer from a more serious
form of the same complaint. Claire and Fanny eat meat, because they like it, while Caroline and
Frances don’t like meat and don’t eat nearly as much as the two others (their parents didn’t give them
meat to eat when they were young and so they never developed a taste for it). Their food budget is the
same, but their medical costs differ. Fanny and Frances have higher medical costs because of their
more serious condition, but because Claire and Fanny eat a lot of meat, they don’t need so much
medicine and so the costs are lower. As a result Claire’s treatment costs 200 per year, Caroline’s 250,
Fanny’s 300 and Frances’s 450. The National Health Service (funded with public money) has an
annual budget of 800, how should they share out the costs?  (Choose just one solution : A, B, C, D, E
or F; see table 1 below)
Question 2:
Charles, Emma, Emmanuel & Damien are all art students in a country in which there are two different
types of art schools(both funded with public money).  Both types deliver an art teacher diploma, but it
is a well-known fact that many of the most famous artists formerly studied at the more prestigious type
of art school. Charles & Emma really want to have their own studio and earn their living from the sale
of their art work, after studying at a prestigious art school. Emmanuel & Damian are quite happy to
become art teachers and decide to go to a less prestigious school. Emma & Emmanuel are more
talented than Charles & Damian who will have to study for longer to reach the same standard; the art
school course for Charles & Emma costs more to run than the course at the art department of the local
college that Emmanuel & Damian attend.





The State does not have enough money to pay all their education costs. How should it share out the
money available ? (Choose just one solution : A, B, C, D, E or F; see table 1 below)
Question 3:
Adrian, Anthony, Paul and Patrick all suffer from asthma and have had to take drugs to control their
condition for some years now. The cost of their treatment depends on two factors: 1) their physical
reaction to the drugs, 2) diligently following the instructions. Adrian and Anthony can’t use the
standard, cheaper treatment because it doesn’t work for them, while Paul and Patrick can use it.
However, Adrian and Paul sometimes forget to take their medecine, while Anthony and Patrick never
forget. If the patient doesn’t take his medecine regularly, it takes longer to get the condition under






These four men all have the same income and pay the same amount of social insurance contributions
and income tax combined. The national health service (funded with public money) has 800 per year to
pay for the four men’s treatment, which means that they will have to pay for some of it themselves.
How do you think they should calculate each man’s individual contribution? (Choose just one
solution: A, B, C, D, E or F; see table 1 below)
Question 4:
Ray, Ralph, Peter and Paul all go to the same school and are weak students. Ray and Paul are,
however, slightly better than Ralph and Peter. The school sets up a system of individual coaching to
help the boys improve their results. Ray and Peter work hard and do their homework while Ralph and
Paul spend more time on extra-curricular activities. Access to the coaching sessions is determined by
the pupils’ original marks and by the effort they make. The cost of the coaching sessions is divided






What criteria would you use to determine how much money the State (or whatever public authority)
should contribute to these individual coaching sessions (the budget is insufficient to meet all the costs),
knowing that the boys’ parents all have the same income? (Choose just one solution: A, B, C, D, E or
F; see table 1 below)
Question 5:
Lisa, Laura, Isabelle and Irene all have respiratory problems. Lisa and Laura have been smokers for
the last 20 years while Isabelle and Irene have never smoked. Lisa and Irene work in a textile factory
where most of their colleagues smoke during the breaks, while Laura and Isabelle are primary school
teachers and work in a healthy environment. The cost of the treatment varies according to the gravity





These four women all have the same income and pay the same amount of social
insurance contributions and income tax combined. The national health service (funded with public
money) has 800 per year to pay for the four women’s treatment. This means that they will have to pay
for  some  of  it  themselves.  How  do  you  think  they  should  calculate  each  woman’s  individual
contribution ? (Choose just one solution : A, B, C, D, E or F; see table 1 below)10

































A 200 250 200 100 200 50 200 0
B 350 100 200 100 150 100 100 100
C 250 200 250 50 150 100 150 50
D 300 150 250 50 100 150 150 50
E 300 150 200 100 167 83 133 67
F 360 90 240 60 111 139 89 111
Table 2 : Answers distribution for each scenario
Question 1  
 
Question 2  
 
Question 3  
 
Question 4  
 
Question 5  
 
 Answer Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
A 66 18% 125 34% 73 20% 79 21% 64 17%
B 116 32% 66 18% 62 17% 100 27% 38 10%
C 82 22% 63 17% 113 31% 88 24% 115 31%
D 41 11% 55 15% 62 17% 57 15% 117 32%
E 46 13% 52 14% 48 13% 43 12% 25 7%
F 17 5% 7 2% 9 2% 5 1% 7 2%
Total 368 100% 368 100% 367 100% 368 100% 366 100%11
2.2 Treatment observance in health context versus effort at school
Question 3 tells now the story of four people who suffer from asthma. Each also
combines the factors effort and circumstances in a different way. Compared to the
previous couple of questions, the effort is here directly at stake : it relates to
treatment observance.
The solution which is most chosen (30%) is the one which equalizes public money
expenses in favour of persons who face identical circumstances (see table 2). About
the same number of people choose solutions A, B, D and E, respectively ‘equality
of public money expenses’, ‘equality of personal financial contribution’, ‘equal
welfare for people similarly responsible’ and the combination of C and D., i.e. the
solution which aims to combine both Fleurbaey-Bossert axioms. These percentages
vary between 14 and 20 %.
In the context of education, the question 4 again tells a similar story than in question
3. As in the context of health, it presents a standard case where the variable of
responsibility  is  directly  expressed  in  the  form  of  the  effort  provided  by  the
individuals, ie in this case, provided in their studies. The costs of (possible) after
school help depend on this effort as well as on individual talents.
Compared to the results obtained on the “same” question asked in health context,
one notices that positions are inversed concerning solutions B and C: in the former
context, a relative priority is given to principle of compensation rather than to
substantive equality ; it is the opposite in the latter. Otherwise, the same structure of
answers is observed in the two contexts
1.
The European comparison permit to underline that an important fraction of French
students are in favour of the principle of compensation in the context of health,
what which is not the case in the context of education,   neither for the other
countries. Otherwise, The Danes seems to be particularly egalitarian in the context
of education compared to the others.
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2.3  Comparison  in  health  context  (tobacco  addiction  versus  treatment
observance)
The comparison is made here between two questions-scenarios in the context of
health only. But the nature of choice and circumstances differ. Question 5 presents
four women with respiratory problems. The structure of the costs to cure them is
similar  to  the  structure  of  the  costs  in  the  question  3  and  reveals  the  same
combination of responsibility and circumstances.
However, despite these similarities, the answers are slightly different (see table 2).
1
The answer D - equal personal contribution for same effort - is clearly preferred in
the tobacco addiction context (question 5) than in the treatment observance context
(question 3) which underlines the particular responsibility attached to smoking
behavior.
3. ETHICAL PRINCIPALS IN THE CONTEXTS OF EDUCATION AND
HEALTH
3.1 Health
In the context of health, medical research may relocate the responsibility cut,
particularly when « targeted alteration of genomes may, for example, turn off some
genes that causally contribute to the emergence of certain illnesses » (Cappelen and
Tunggoden (2006), p. 358). The relocation of responsibility cut can also be done
insofar that the development of knowledge in Medicine or Psychology affect the
factors we consider as beyond the control of the individual or not. Genetics again is
a  particular  illustration  of  such  developments  :  the  full  sequencing  of  human
genome  notably  permitted  to  understand  that  some  disease  or  some  troubles
(especially mental or psychic troubles) could be associated with genes (although not
explained by genes)
2.  Such results can have implication for the redistribution in
health context in a more complex manner that it could appear at first sight. Taking
into account of the personal responsibility of people regarding health behavior is
subject to an important philosophical and normative debate. The solution proposed
by  Roemer  (1998)  may  be  technically  difficult  to  set  up  but  is  also  morally
questionable : how to be sure that an unhealthy behavior is the result of free choice
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an not of habits deeply rooted during childhood because of education given by
parents, influence of neighborhood or due to some genetic predisposition ?
1
A part of the questionnaire we submit to students of the four countries tends to
know more about the way the location of responsibility cut can be done and to
reveal the associated level (if any) to redistribution in health context only.
We ask for several questions : some of them  are related to informational contexts
where it could appear rather clear that the elements belong to circumstances beyond
responsibility of individual and others which seem clearly being the consequences
of unhealthy behaviors freely chosen. But is it so evident and should redistribution
depend on such a responsibility cut ?
The key question is then first :   in  which contexts,  people- and here the students of
our sample - consider that bad health is the result of circumstances rather than of
personal responsibility and free choice?
In general the respondents judged the factors which increase the risks of individual
diseases as ‘circumstances’. This is expressed in the overwhelming willingness to
support a solidarity system in favor of persons who are exposed to high risks,
independently of the underlying causes of these risks. This is illustrated by the
results of question 6, which proposes the possibility of imposing supplementary
insurance costs for people who incur a higher risk. A large majority of people
rejects the very idea of higher insurance contributions for persons with higher risks
of becoming ill, even when this risk is related to unhealthy food habits, irregular
health control or genetic antecedents.
Notable exceptions are smoking and the practice of dangerous sports: people are
held responsible for increased risks implied by one of these causes. But even in
these cases, opinions are not very categorical: in the case of smoking, the three
proposals (no supplementary insurance cost, supplement of 10 % or supplement of
30 %) get about the same percentage of choice (with a slight relative majority for
the severe increase). With respect to dangerous sports, the absolute majority of
people reject an increased insurance bill, but 31 % of the people are in favour of a
small increase.
                                                       
1 Wikler (2002) notes that « actions only rarely have all the attributes –informed, voluntary, uncoerced,
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responsibility. This is a particular problem in the case of lifestyles, which are matters of habit
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pleasure ». (pp. 50-51).14
Question 6
Do you think it is desirable to make someone pay a higher health insurance premium (or higher taxes if
the health service is funded with tax money) if the likelihood of them being ill is greater for one of the
following reasons? :
(tick the relevant box)









of  up  to
30%  is
justifiable
Family medical background (a)
Personal medical history (b)
Irregular medical care ( c)
Behaviour which may increase the risks :
Poor nutrition (d)
Chain smoking (e)
Regular  participation  in  dangerous  sporting
activities (f)
Results of question 6:
Question 6a : Question 6b : Question 6c : Question 6d: Question 6e: Question 6f:
  Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Freq. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc Freq. Perc.
No
increase 317 85% 248 85% 263 71% 232 62% 96 26% 185 50%
10%
increase 44 12% 97 12% 78 21% 112 30% 124 33% 115 31%
30%
increase 12 3% 29 3% 29 8% 31 8% 153 41% 73 20%
  373 100% 374 100% 370 100% 375 100% 373 100% 373 100%15
Results of question 6 by country:
Question 6a Italy France Denmark Sweden
Absence of premium 88% 77% 89% 87%
Extra premium of 10% 10% 17% 10% 10%
Extra premium of 30% 2% 6% 1% 3%
        Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Question 6b Italy France Denmark Sweden
Absence of premium 63% 57% 79% 67%
Extra premium of 10% 28% 29% 17% 29%
Extra premium of 30% 9% 14% 4% 3%
        Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Question 6c Italy France Denmark Sweden
Absence of premium 59% 63% 82% 82%
Extra premium of 10% 29% 27% 13% 15%
Extra premium of 30% 12% 10% 5% 3%
        Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Question 6d Italy France Denmark Sweden
Absence of premium 70% 63% 57% 58%
Extra premium of 10% 22% 35% 29% 33%
Extra premium of 30% 9% 2% 14% 9%
        Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Question 6e Italy France Denmark Sweden
Absence of premium 28% 16% 34% 26%
Extra premium of 10% 30% 36% 34% 33%
Extra premium of 30% 42% 47% 33% 42%
        Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Question 6f Italy France Denmark Sweden
Absence of premium 47% 47% 55% 49%
Extra premium of 10% 30% 30% 26% 37%
Extra premium of 30% 23% 22% 19% 13%
        Total 100% 100% 100% 100%16
When  we  compare  the  results  between  countries,  we  observe  that  the  most
egalitarian countries (such Denmark and Sweden) do not take into account the
responsibility (see 6c) When it is asked whether an increase of the insurance cost is
justified  by  personal  antecedents  (q6b),  it  is  noticed  that  the  Danes  are  more
strongly against such an increase than the average of the other countries. At the
opposite, the French are more often in favour of an increase either of 10 or of 30%
than the other countries.   If an irregular medical follow-up is at the origin of a
possible increase of the price of individual health insurance, the Scandinavian
countries are massively against this increase (on average with more than 80%)
while in France and Italy only one student out of six adheres to this opinion. In the
latter countries, more than 35% of the people is in favour of an increase of 10%
(only a little more than 15% in the Scandinavian countries). Bad food habits are
judged differently by the Italians and the Swedes. Bad food habits are not legitimate
reasons to induce a higher insurance price for 70% and 59% of their respective
respondent samples. The French are as more often as the others in favour of an
increase of 10% while the Danes favour particularly an increase of 30%, if bad food
habits are at the origin of higher costs.
Strong addiction to tobacco leads to extremely different opinions. The French are
most willingly to ‘punish’ smokers by a higher insurance price, even increased by
30 %. The Danes are the most tolerant toward smokers and do not want to punish
them severely, if they want to punish them at all.
If the unhealthy behavior is subject to some discussion regarding responsibility
debate we can imagine that the problem of “altered” genetic endowment is not. In
the following question, we consider the case in which genetic endowments are the
cause of social and economic inequalities. In question 7 the focus is on a genetic
predisposition to develop a relatively mild disease, the impact of which varies a lot
in function of chosen behavior (lifestyle, hygiene). In this situation the majority of
the respondents (50%) chooses to equalize individual contributions, which implies
that neither genetic endowment nor an unhealthy lifestyle are considered to be
legitimate causes of inequality. However, one should notice that a not negligible
percentage of individuals think that persons who have a higher risk to catch a
disease should pay a higher contribution (solution B, 22% of the answers). Quite
similarly, higher risks related to an unhealthy lifestyle should also lead, according to
a part of the respondents, to a higher contribution to the health insurance system.17
Question 7
Matthew, Martine, John and Julie work for the same computer company. They have all taken
medical tests to monitor their genetic tendency to develop minor illnesses like colds and flu. These
tests show that Matthew and Martine are twice as likely to catch these illnesses as John and Julie,
supposing that they all lead a healthy lifestyle (moderate use of alcohol and tobacco, regular sleep
patterns, balanced diet and regular physical exercise). On the other hand, Matthew and John would be
more susceptible to illness if they all adopted an unhealthy lifestyle. Based on the hypothesis that the
probability of catching minor illnesses depends on genetic inheritance and behavior and not on their
environment, the probability of each worker being ill is as follows:
 In reality, all of them except John have a healthy lifestyle. Supposing that the social insurance office
(funded with public money) was perfectly informed of the risks but not of each person’s actual
behaviour. It has to decide how much each worker should contribute. Of the following solutions,
which one seems fairest to you? (Choose just one solution : A, B, C or D)
Matthew Martine John Julie
A 10% 10% 10% 10%
B 13.5% 13.5% 7% 7%
C 14% 8% 13% 4%
D 14% 10% 10% 5%
Results
Question 7 : Italy France Sweden Denmark Ensemble
A 35% 35% 60% 81% 52%
B 41% 24% 16% 5% 22%
C 17% 36% 19% 9% 20%
D 6% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Matthew Martine John Julie
Risk with healthy lifestyle 1/2 1/2 1/4 _
Risk with unhealthy lifestyle 4/5 1/2 3/4 _18
Here  the  opinions  between  countries  diverge  clearly.  The  Italians  are  divided
between the formal equality of the individual contributions and a principle of
proportionality to the risk of illness – if people have a healthy life style. The French
have  partly  similar  opinions,  but  they  are  also  favourable  to  the  principle  of
proportionality of contributions to the risk of illness when people have an unhealthy
way of living. The Danes are strongly in favour of the formal equality of the
individual contributions (80%), the Swedes often approve this same principle (60%)
but are also in favour of the two principles of proportionality.   
Question 8 (see below) concerns individuals having certain genetic predispositions
to develop diseases, but for whom, actual disease is a function of the possibility of a
medical  treatment.  The  different  genetic  endowments  are  reflected  in  income
differences, which are more of less important depending on whether or not the
individuals  had  the  opportunity  to  have  a  medical  treatment.  42  %  of  the
respondents  opt  for  B,  in  which  salaries  are  proportional  to  the  potential
performances,  that  is  the  performances  that  would  be  possible  following  the
treatment. But the other solutions, salaries proportional to effective performances
and salaries proportional to potential performances without treatment are also quite
often chosen (30 % and 27 %).
The Italians and the Swedes are mainly in favour of final payments proportional to
the performances when there is a treatment, while the Danes favour more often to
final payments proportionality to the effective performances. The French on the
other hand are divided between these two opinions and final payments proportional
to the performances without treatment.19
Question 8
Let’s imagine that in the future it will be possible to improve our physical and intellectual potential
using biological drugs or genetic therapy. Matthew, Martine, John and Julie all apply for promotion in
their company. Before deciding who to employ the company makes them all take a test to reveal their
memory skills, ability to concentrate etc. Matthew and Martine score twice as much as John and Julie.
In addition we know that Matthew and John had taken biological drugs to increase their potential
during their work experience placement in the USA in their final year at university. On the other hand,
neither Martine nor Julie had ever taken these drugs as they were not available in their country. The
real (in bold print) and potential scores on their tests are as follows supposing an arbitrary scale of 0 to
150.
The company decides to promote all four applicants and now needs to fix their salaries. The total sum
available for the four salaries depends on the total scores and not anyone’s individual score. It must not
exceed 1000 (supposing, to simplify, that social security and tax contributions remain the same for
everyone). Which of these salary plans do you think the company should choose ? (Choose one
solution : A, B or C)
Matthew Martine John Julie
A        334        334        166        166
B        303        364        150        182
C        307        385        115        192
Question 8 Italy France Denmark Sweden Ensemble
A 21% 23% 45% 31% 30%
B 55% 41% 28% 46% 42%
C 24% 35% 27% 22% 27%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Matthew Martine John Julie
With drugs 100 120 50 60
Without drugs 80 100 30 5020
3.2 Education
The philosophical and normative debate about equality of opportunity regarding
education  is  also  nourished.  Many  questions  are  at  stake  :  how  to  improve
efficiency when we want to consider at the same time the social inequality that
prevent young people to develop their abilities ? How to give incentives to the most
talented and how  to  take into account seriously the question of the least talented ?
Some authors consider that luck egalitarianism should promote for all children the
equalization of fundamental cognitive abilities. Moreover the incentives should
function at best for the most talented. Such a system should also imply incentives
towards teachers and parents insofar the school results attained by children depend
not only of their intrisic (innate ?) abilities but also of both the quality of teaching
and the care of the parents (Trannoy, 1999). For others, the point focuses on the
improvement of the social mixity between children whose social and economic
background is favorable and those whose background is not (Brighouse, 2000 ;
Swift , 2003).
The question 9 examined here focuses on potential inequalities related to different
individual talents while no characterization is given in terms of responsibility. This
question is useful to see whether the efficient use of the education budget conflicts
with the egalitarian concern which would recommend helping the least talented.
The  generally  selected  criterion  is  A,  which  is  a  combination  between  the
egalitarian criterion and the criterion of efficiency (53%); the criterion in favour of
the least talented and which means less efficient investments is chosen by 28% of
the respondents while the criterion which recommends the most efficient allowance
is chosen by 19%.
In  the  question  9,  the  Danes  are  in  favour  of  the  principle  which  combines
efficiency and redistributions for the least talented (80% against 50%), while the
French less often subscribe this principle (43%). The latter are more often in favour
of compensation of the least talented than the other countries. The Swedes show as
a light tendency to subscribe this principle, while the Italians are both in favour of
the principle of compensation and the one of efficiency.21
Question 9
The Ministry of Education has an additional budget of 180 to improve Peter, John and James’s
educational  standard.  It  is  possible  to  measure  their  progress  using  certain  tests.  Each  child’s
performance improves proportionally to his abilities and to the money invested in him by the Ministry
of Education. Peter, whose intelligence is above average, improves more quickly than John, who is
about average, and much more quickly than James who is below average.
The three tales below indicate possible schemes for dividing the budget, charting the pupils’ progress
in each case. In the society they live in, salaries earned are usually related to the person’s individual
educational performance.
Which way of sharing out the budget seems fairest to you ? (choose just one solution)
SCHEME 1
Peter John James Total
Investment 60 60 60 180
Performance 120 60 40 220
SCHEME 2
Peter John James Total
Investment 30 60 90 180
Performance 60 60 60 180
SCHEME 3
Peter John James Total
Investment 90 45 45 180
Performance 180 45 30 255
Results:
Question 9 : Italy France Denmark Sweden Ensemble
A 47% 43% 70% 52% 53%
B 26% 39% 14% 31% 28%
C 26% 18% 16% 17% 19%
D 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%22
4. DETERMINANTS OF ETHICAL OPINIONS
In this section, we confront the answers to the scenarios with other ethical and
political  opinions  and  with  individual  characteristics  of  the  respondents:
demographic  characteristics  (sex  and  nationality)  and  socio-economics
characteristics (diplomas of the parents, family size, family’s income, expected
income…).
We use a multiple correspondence analysis (mca) in a first step and multinomial
logistic regressions in a second step.
4.1 Evaluating the proximity of different ethical opinions with the help of an mca
We use an mca in this section to assess the proximity of the ethical opinions in
different  contexts.  We  focus  on  the  relevance  of  the  dichotomy  “choice-
circumstances” in the context of health related to observance and to the reward of
effort in the education system (questions-scenarios 3   and 4)).
1 We add questions
about insurance health (differentiation of insurance cost according to the existence
of personal medical antecedents or to different genetic predispositions - questions 6
and 7) and questions about the arbitration equality/efficiency in the context of
education and about inheritance tax. Furthermore, political opinion, nationality, and
sex of the respondents are introduced as supplementary variables (i.e as variables
which do not participate to the dimensions set up). We have to notice that any other
available characteristics of the respondents (family size, diplomas of the parents,
religion) appear to be explaining the two main dimensions of the mca presented
below.
                                                       
1 The idea is to reveal which ethical principles are to be selected by people when the dichotomy
« circumstances/choice » prevails. However, in a multiple correspondence analysis, it is not relevant to
study the entire set of « circumstances/choice » questions-scenarios because of the high correlation
between the answers to these questions. So, we confront the answers to some of questions within the
full set of “questions-scenario” to the answers to more usual questions about preferences towards
redistribution.23
Graph 1 : location of the variables on the two main dimensions of the mca
Reading of the graph (Coding of the variables):
*SCENARIOS :
Distribution A of the questions scenarios=neutrality (neut); distribution B of the scenarios=equality (egal)
questions; distribution C and E of the questions scenarios =impartiality (imp); distribution D and F of the
scenarios=reward (rec). Question 3 (asthma, treatment observance)=obs; ; Question 4 (reward of the effort, at
school)  eff.
** OTHER QUESTIONS
Question 6b (premiums of insurance): absence of prime=zero; extra premium of 10%=10; extra premium of 30%
=30  Question  7  (predispositions  genetics):  distribution  A  (mutualisation)=mut,  distribution  B  (premium
proportional to the risk)=act, distribution C and D (between mutualisation and actualization) =mix. Question 9
(arbitration equality/efficiency in teaching): Q9-1 (distribution1) =arbitrage-egality (arb-egal), Q9-2 (distribution
2) =arbitrage-compensation (arb-comp), Q9-3 (distribution 3) = arbitration efficiency (arb-eff). Question 10
(inheritance tax, see annex1): Q10-1 (favourable)=ntax, Q10-2 (unfavourable)=ntaxe. P1 to P5 on the graph
correspond to political opinions collected with a graduate scale (see annex2)  from 1(extreme left) to 7(extreme
right): answers 1 and 2 are pooled in a same category (P1) and answers 6 and 7 in the category P5, so P2
corresponds to answer 3, P3 to answer 4 and P4 to answer 5.
*** COUNTRY: I= Italy; F=France; S=Sweden; D= Denmark
The graph shows the clear superposition of the various variables associated to the
“choice-circumstances” questions: to make treatment observance efforts or to make
school efforts seem to be judged similarly. We also notice that the mapping of the24
graph is largely explained by the opposition “equality”/“reward-impartiality” on
dimension  “1”.  This  opposition  can  be  understood  as  an  opposition  between
“equality” on one side and responsibility-sensitive answers on the other side. As
awaited, on this dimension, the maximum extra premium (30) is found on the “side”
of “responsibility” whereas the absence of extra premium (zero) is noticed on the
“side” of   “equality”. The French and the Italian are opposed to the Swedish, the
latter being more favourable to equality, to the absence of extra premium and to the
mutualization of the genetic risks.
The other dimension opposes on one side the “neutrality” variables to the variables
of “rewards” and “equality” on the other side. We can interpret this opposition as an
opposition  between  libertarian  and  egalitarian  opinions;  actually,  the  different
political opinions are clearly organized along this second dimension as the opinion
about  inheritance  tax  is.  We  must  notice  that  the  opposition  between
“responsibility”  and  “equality”  (dimension  “1”)  does  not  explain  the  political
opinions dispersion.
The answers about the trade-off between equality and efficiency in the context of
education have to be explained by the two dimensions except for the egalitarian
answer  (arb-equal) which is, without surprise, precisely localized on the first
dimension (on the “equality” side). The “efficiency-answer” (arb-eff) is a positive
combination of the two dimensions and the “compensation-answer” (arb-comp) is
logically  very  close  to  the  “reward  answers”  associated  with  the  “choice-
circumstances” questions.
We also observe that the variable which is taking into account the real genetic risk
(actua) is “close” to the variables of “rewards”. It is a rather curious proximity since
it supposes that a genetic risk has the same ethical status that a lack of medical
treatment observance or an insufficient effort at school. This proximity shows the
large scope of current meanings of the notion of responsibility.
The following section focusing on individual determinants of ethical opinions will
confirm the specific role of opinion on mutualization of genetic risks.
4.2. Individual determinants of ethical opinions
In order to point out that the determinants of answers differ according to the
context, we analyze the individual answers to one specific question –scenario about
the equality/efficiency trade off in the context of education (question 9) and the
individual answers to two similar “choice-circumstances” questions: one dealing
with treatment observance in a medical context (question 3) and one dealing with
effort at school (question 4). In addition to the usual individual characteristics
collected in our survey (sex, nationality, family income, expected income, diplomas
of  the  parents)  we  use,  as  potential  determinants  of  the  ethical  opinions,  two
meaningful opinions that can be considered as “fundamental” opinions with regard25
to the more sophisticated “choice-circumstances” questions: opinion about the tax
inheritance (question 10, annex 1) and opinion about the mutualization of the
genetic risks (question 7).
Answers of “Choice circumstances” question related to treatment observance:
The  first  multinomial  logistic  regression  (table  3)  explains  the  probability  of
choosing “equality”, “neutrality” or “reward” answers rather than “impartiality-
answer” associated with the “choice-circumstances” question related to the context
of treatment observance (question 3). Clearly, as we already noticed, Danish and
Swedish students, in this context, tend to be more favourable to egalitarian policies
than  French  students.  Students  expecting  very  high  future  incomes  are  quite
logically  less  favourable  to  these  policies.  More  amazingly,  it  appears  that
respondents of whom the mother has a high or a low diploma are less likely to
choose “equality-answer” whereas the father’s diploma has no impact. We will see
below that the contrary is true for the education’s scenario (question 8). It suggests a
complex influence of parents’ diplomas on the ethical opinions formation.
The “neutrality-answer” is not influenced by individual characteristics. It is just
correlated with other ethical or political opinions: first, respondents favourable to
inheritance tax removing choose more likely the “neutrality-answer” which could
be the result of the libertarian meaning of the neutrality principle; second, students
who prefer a partial actualization of genetic risks to a total mutualization are less
likely to choose the “neutrality” answer. Once again, this last point reveals the link
between  opinions  about  mutualization  of  genetic  risks  and  responsibility
sensitiveness.
At  last,  we  notice  that  it  is  impossible  to  statistically  distinguish  between
determinants of “reward-answers” and determinants of “impartiality-answers”; it
suggests  again  that  these  two  answers  are  the  result  of  similar  responsibility
sensitiveness.
Answers of “Choice circumstances” question related to effort at school:
At first glance, it is striking to see that it is not the same variables which influence
the answers to this “choice-circumstance” question (table 4). Students of whom the
father  has  a  low  diploma  prefer  responsibility  free  answers  -  “equality”  and
“neutrality” answers - to “impartiality-answer”: it is perhaps difficult to relate
individual responsibility and school performance when her/his father gets a low
diploma.26
Expected incomes have a noticeable influence on “equality” and “reward” answers:
students who expect a higher or a lower income than the reference expected income
1
are more likely to choose “equality” and “reward” answers. We can understand that
students who expect very high income would like to be rewarded for their effort and
so tend to choose the rewarding of effort at school; it is more difficult to see why
students who expect rather low income are more likely to prefer, at the same time,
egalitarian and rewarding policies.
The nationality of the respondents has here a slight effect. We just can notice that
Swedish students are less likely to choose “neutrality-answer” than “impartiality-
answer”. At last, respondents favourable to partial or total actualisation of genetic
risks, here again, are less likely to choose “neutrality-answer”.
Answers of question about equality/efficiency trade off in teaching:
Even  in  a  different  context,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  the  choice  of
compensation of effort is correlated with the opinion favourable to the actualization
of the genetics risks (table 5). As awaited, we can notice that compared to French
students, Swedish students prefer equality to efficiency. When the comparison is
made with Italian students, we also observe that they choose equality more often
than  compensation  schemes.  At  last,  we  can  observe  that  the  preference  for
efficiency is associated with inheritance tax removing.   Moreover, efficiency is
rather a male tendency. Perhaps, the choice of inheritance tax removing answer
tends to reveal an efficiency concern rather than an actual ethical opinion.
These empirical investigations allow us to discern that ethical opinions as elicited
by the scenarios cannot be explained by the few individual characteristics available
in the survey. Moreover, it appears clearly that ethical opinions in a “choice-
circumstances”  framework  cannot  be  explained  by  individual  characteristics
independently of the context i.e independently of the nature of the choice.
                                                       
1 Which corresponds to and income slightly above the median income: the fourth item of a scale
graduated from 1 to 5.27
Table 3: Multinomial logistic regression of answers of “choice-circumstances”
question related to treatment observance (question 3)








Mother’s diploma : . .
No diploma -.79** .378 -0.20 .362 .24 .364
Bachelor ref ref ref ref ref ref
Graduate -1.00** .466 -.15 .420 -.16 .447
Opinion about premium for genetic
risk covering (question 5) :
Mutualization (Q7-A) ref ref ref ref ref ref
Actualization (Q7-B) -.62 .482 -.39 .402 .13 .391
Mixed (Q7-C/D) -.68* .416 -.96** .406 -.15 .360
Nationality :
French ref ref ref ref ref ref
Italian .79 .583 .23 .483 .18 .459
Danish 1.24** .541 .27 .4’3 .71* .429
Swedish 1.48** .522 .04 .454 .11 .460
Expected income (collected with a
scale graduate from 1 to 5 from low
income to high income)
low expected income (item 1 and 2) -.25 .683 -.15 .659 .13 .657
Medium expected income (item 3) -.72 .471 -.64 .436 .36 .384
High expected income (item 4) ref ref ref ref ref Ref
Very high expected income (item 5) -.77* .420 -.21 .364 -.06 .384
Opinion about tax inheritance
Favourable to tax removing -.14 .344 .81** .347 .25 .320
Not favourable to tax removing ref ref ref ref ref ref
Constant -.62 .565 -.82 .504 -.33 .518
Likelihood = - 435
N = 355
1 The non significant independent variables have been removed from the regression.
2 “Impartiality-answer” is the reference answer.
3. ** means that the coefficient is significant at 5% level; * means that the coefficient is significant at 10% level28
Table 4: Multinomial logistic regression of answers of “choice-circumstances”
question related to support and effort at school (question 4)








Father’s diploma : . .
No diploma .75** .362 .67* .378 .06 .407
Bachelor ref ref ref ref ref ref
Graduate .26 .440 .44 .440 .26 .454
Opinion about premium for genetic
risk covering (question 5) :
Mutualization (Q7-A) ref ref ref ref ref Ref
Actualization (Q7-B) -.18 .430 -1.05** .439 .59 .425
Mixed (Q7-C/D) -.51 .349 -.86** .371 -.27 .425
Nationality :
French
Italian -.08 .472 -.10 .446 -.33 .518
Danish -.18 .430 -.26 .479 .06 .473
Swedish -.21 .413 -.80* .452 -.80 .548
Expected income (collected with a
scale graduate from 1 to 5 from low
income to high income)
low expected income (item 1 and 2) -.04 .676 .63 .649 .29 .694
Medium expected income (item 3) -.84** .384 -.39 .400 -.95** .446
High expected income (item 4) ref ref ref ref ref ref
Very high expected income (item 5) -.57 .349 -.16 .372 -.78* .423
Constant -.02 .467 -.11 .488 -.33 .518
Likelihood = - 462
N = 360
1 The non significant independent variables have been removed from the regression.
2 “Impartiality-answer” is the reference answer.
3. ** means that the coefficient is significant at 5% level; * means that the coefficient is significant at 10% level29
Table 5: Multinomial logistic regression of answers of the question related to






Female .28 .274 -.71** .309
Opinion about premium for genetic
risk covering (question 5) :
Mutualization (Q7-A) ref ref ref ref
Actualization (Q7-B) .74** .335 .32 .408
Mixed (Q7-C/D) -.21 .333 .39 .350
Nationality :
French
Italian -.66* .357 .27 .406
Danish -.38 .369 -.67 .446
Swedish -1.50** .414 -.83* .447
Opinion about tax inheritance :
Favourable to tax removing .20 .279 .86** .327
Not favourable to tax removing ref ref ref Ref
Constant -.49 .357 -1.14** .428
Likelihood = - 340
N = 362
1 The non significant independent variables have been removed from the regression.
2 “Impartiality-answer” is the reference answer.
3. ** means that the coefficient is significant at 5% level; * means that the coefficient is significant at 10% level30
Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to find out to which extent people are likely to validate
the  ‘choice/circumstances’  dichotomy  as  a  legitimate  basis  for  redistributive
policies in different contexts (especially health and education). It seems that context
dependency  matters  for  the  students  of  our  sample  regarding  “circumstances/
choice” dichotomy but the link with redistribution policy is far from being clear.
It is shown here that the criterion of the strict responsibility (as represented by the
principle of natural reward in the Bossert-Fleurbaey framework) is not validated
except to a certain extent in the context of tobacco addiction. Otherwise, holding
individuals at responsible for their behaviour is often approved in the context of
health in particular by the French and the Italians, and not by the Swedes and the
Danes (except for bad food habits).
Let us note that in the context of education, the ambitions tend to be considered by
the individuals as variables of responsibility and not as variables of circumstances.
From the point of view of health-education comparison, we can notice that to make
medical treatment observance efforts or to make school choice efforts seem to be
judged similarly. We also observe amazingly that a genetic risk has the same ethical
status that a lack of medical treatment observance or an insufficient effort at school.
The question of the genetic predispositions and their productive impact demands a
particular comment: the descriptive statistics show in addition that the impact that
such  predispositions  can  have  on  health  and/or  the  productive  efficiency  can
legitimate a specific redistribution, although large minorities of the population seem
opposed to such redistribution, in particular when individual behaviour does not
take these predispositions into account. These results, somewhat ambiguous, would
deserve  further  research  because  the  genetic  factor  is  clearly  an  unfavourable
circumstance which can limit severely someone’s opportunities and requires greater
efforts from “poorly” endowed categories of individuals.
If we focus on medical treatment observance, we notice that the “equality-answer”
is less chosen by students of whom the mother has a high or low diploma whereas
the father’s diploma has no impact. It is the opposite result which is obtained in the
context of effort provided at school : perhaps it is difficult to relate individual
responsibility and school when her/his father gets a low diploma.  In the context of
education, accurately, expected incomes have a noticeable influence on “equality”
or “reward” answers: students who expect a higher or a lower income than the
reference  expected  income  are  more  likely  to  choose  “equality”  or  “reward”
answers. We can understand that students who expect very high income would like
to be rewarded for their effort and so tend to choose the rewarding of effort at
school; it is more difficult to see why students who expect rather low income are
more likely to prefer, at the same time, egalitarian and rewarding policies. The
nationality of the respondents has here a slight effect only  : we just can notice that31
Swedish students are less likely to choose “neutrality-answer” than “impartiality-
answer”.
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Annex
Annex 1 : question 10 (about inheritance tax)
In a hypothetical country
1 nowadays an only child who inherits from his parents
pays inheritance tax (“death duties”) if the inheritance is worth 100 000€ or more.
Where the inheritance is over that figure the percentage paid in death duties varies
from 5% if the total is up to 7600€ over the maximum to 40% if the total is over
1 700 000€. It is estimated that one person in six pays death duties on what they
inherit from their parents (it should be noticed that, in our hypothetical country,
gifts made to a child during the parents’ lifetime are tax free up to a total of 30 000€
per child and per parent in any ten year period).
Do you think that (Answer this question Yes or No).:
Death duties should be abolished
Yes No
Annex 2: Additional socio-demographic questions
Here there are some additional questions about you. We are interested in that only
for statistical purpose, while your privacy will be fully guaranteed. Please note that
you do not have to sign or write your name on this copy.
You are :  Male Female
Your mother is (or was in the case she is now retired)
Employer/manager
Professional Worker (lawyer, accountant, teacher,
etc.)
Employee (office worker, etc.)
Manual worker
Farmer or Agricultural Worker
                                                       
1 The monetary units used in this scenario are Euros (remember that 1 Euro= …crowns): think about a
new hypothetical country which is different than those considered until now. The new hypothetical
country looks like a European one.34
Unemployed (or at least during a long period of
time)
Never had job
Your father is (or was in the case he is retired)
Employer/manager
Professional Worker (lawyer, accountant, teacher,
etc.)
Employee (office worker, etc.)
Manual worker
Farmer or Agricultural Worker
Unemployed (or at least during a long period of
time)
Never had job
The highest level of education your mother reached is
Lower than secondary education
Secondary education
Higher than secondary education
The highest level of education your father reached is
Lower than secondary education
Secondary education
Higher than secondary education
How  many  children  were  in  the  household  where  you  grew  up  (including
you)………..
Here is a scale of income and we would like to know in what group the household
where you grew up is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that
come in. Circle the number that corresponds to your household (with 1= lowest
level of income in your society and 7= highest level of income in your society)35
1 2 3 4 5 6
7
Now project yourself 10 ten years in the future. Here is a scale of income and we
would like to know in what group of income you expect to be in 10 years from now.
Circle the number that corresponds to your household (with 1= lowest level of
income in your society and 7= highest level of income in your society)
1 2 3 4 5 6
7
In Political matters, people talk of “the left” and of “the right”. How would you
place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (with 1= the most leftist view
and 7= the most rightist view)
1 2 3 4 5 6
7
Did  the  environment  where  you  grew  up  convey  any  religious  education  or
practice?
Y N